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Nash Equilibrium Approximation under Communication and
Computation Constraints in Large-Scale Non-cooperative Games
Ehsan Nekouei, Tansu Alpcan and Girish Nair
Abstract—This paper studies the problem of Nash equilib-
rium approximation in large-scale heterogeneous (static) mean-
field games under communication and computation constraints.
A deterministic mean-field game is considered in which the
utility function of each agent depends on its action, the average
of other agents’ actions (called the mean variable of that agent)
and a deterministic parameter. It is shown that the equilibrium
mean variables of all agents converge uniformly to a constant,
called asymptotic equilibrium mean (AEM), as the number of
agents tends to infinity. The AEM, which depends on the limit
of empirical distribution of agents’ parameters, determines the
asymptotic equilibrium behavior of agents. Next, the problem
of approximating the AEM at a processing center under
communication and computation constraints is studied. Three
approximation methods are proposed to substantially reduce
the communication and computation costs of approximating
AEM at the processing center. The accuracy of the proposed
approximation methods is analyzed and illustrated through
numerical examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides mathematical frameworks for an-
alyzing and predicting the strategic behavior of profit-
maximizing agents. Computing the solution of a game is
a central research problem in the game theory literature.
However, in large population games, it may not be compu-
tationally feasible to precisely calculate a game’s solution.
Furthermore, even when the computation of solution is
possible, it may not provide any insight on the interplay
between the equilibrium and population of the game. To
understand the equilibrium behavior of large-scale games,
which are computationally difficult to solve, it is common
to analyze them in the infinite population limit. Despite the
asymptotic nature of this method, it provides approximate
solutions for large-scale games and sheds light on their
equilibrium-population interplay.
Finding an approximate solution in large-scale heteroge-
neous games, where the agents’ utilities are asymmetric,
becomes a cumbersome task as such solutions depend on
a large number of parameters. When the approximate solu-
tion is computed centrally, e.g., using the cloud computing
technology, each agent needs to transmit its parameters to
the “cloud” which requires substantial communication and
storage resources. The current paper studies the problem of
approximating the equilibrium behavior of large-scale games
under communication and computation constraints.
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A. Related work
Aumann in [1] showed that in a market with a continuum
of traders the core of the market, i.e., the set of allocations
in which traders have no motivation for coalition, coincides
with the equilibrium allocation, thus, the market becomes
perfectly competitive. The authors in [2] studied the value
of a voting game with large number of agents. These results
were extended to cooperative games in [3]. Haurie and
Marcotte in [4] considered a transportation network with
m source-destination pairs in which each source-destination
pair has n identical agents sharing the same link traversal
cost and the same demand function. They showed that as n
becomes large the equilibrium flow of links is characterized
by a Wardop equilibrium. We note that the existence of
pure Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative games with a
continuum of players, i.e, with an uncountable set of agents,
has been studied in [5], [6], [7] and [8].
Homogeneous deterministic mean-field games, wherein
each agent’s utility depends on the mean of all agents’ states
(or control strategies), have been investigated in the literature.
The papers [9] and [10] examined the equilibrium behavior
of homogenous continuous-time (deterministic) mean-field
games as well as their engineering applications. The authors
in [11] proposed a mean-field based decentralized equi-
librium seeking algorithm for a homogenous discrete-time
game with application in the plug-in electric vehicle charging
problem. The paper [12] proposed decentralized equilibrium
seeking methodologies for linear quadratic mean-field games
with convex states. The interested reader is refereed to [13],
[14], [15] and references therein for a thorough treatment
of the stochastic mean filed games with minor and major
agents.
Different from these works, the current paper focuses on
the problem of approximating the equilibrium strategies of
agents, in heterogeneous, static (deterministic) mean-field
games, under communication and computation constraints.
B. Contributions
This paper considers the problem of approximating the
Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative mean-field game at
a processing center. A heterogeneous, deterministic mean-
field game is considered in which the (non-linear) utility
function of each agent i depends on its action, the average
of other agents’ actions (called the mean variable of agent
i) and a deterministic parameter αi. First, the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the considered
game are studied. It is shown that the equilibrium mean
variables of all agents converge uniformly to a constant
called asymptotic equilibrium mean (AEM) as the number
of agents becomes large. The AEM, which characterizes the
asymptotic behavior of each agent’s NE strategy, depends on
the limit of (deterministic) empirical distribution of {αi}i.
Next, three approximation methods are proposed to reduce
the computational/communication complexity of finding the
AEM at a processing center. The AEM is the solution of
an implicit equation which involves integration with respect
to the limiting distribution of {αi}i (see equation (4) for
more details). The first approximation method reduces the
computational complexity of solving the implicit equation
by quantizing the underlying distribution function. Under this
method, the processing center requires the knowledge of the
limiting distribution of {αi}i.
The second method approximates the AEM using the
empirical distribution of {αi}i. This method is suitable for
applications in which the limiting distribution of {αi}i is not
known. However, it requires that each agent i to transmit its
αi to the processing center which might entail substantial
communication and storage costs when the agents’ popu-
lation is large. Under the third approximation method, the
processing center receives the quantized versions of {αi}i
and approximates the AEM using the quantized values. The
accuracy of the proposed approximation methods is inves-
tigated. The proposed approximation methods significantly
reduce the (computation/communication) cost of evaluating
the equilibrium of large scale heterogeneous games using
modern computation technologies, e.g., cloud computing.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II describes our system model and assumptions. Section III
presents our results on the asymptotic equilibrium behav-
ior of agents. Section IV studies the AEM approximation
problem under communication and computation constraints.
Section V presents the numerical results and Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a static non-cooperative game with n agents. Let
u (xi, zi,n, αi) denote the utility function and xi the action
(decision) of agent i. The utility function is parameterized
by αi ∈ R and
zi,n =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
xj
is the mean variable observed by agent i, i.e., the average of
actions of all agents except the i-the one. The action space of
each agent is assumed to be limited to the interval [a, b] ⊂ R
as a starting point, which we will generalize to jointly convex
and compact constraint sets in the future. We refer to the
defined n-player non-cooperative game among agents as Gn.
Note that the utility functions of agents belong to the
parametrized family of functions {u (·, ·, α)}α∈R. The inter-
pretation of the α parameter depends on the underlying appli-
cation. For example, consider the power control problem in
downlink code-division-multiple-access networks in a slow
fading environment with non-orthogonal spreading codes and
match filter receivers. In this application, the parameter αi
may represent the channel power gain between the base
station and receiver (agent) i.
In non-cooperative games, each agent selfishly maximizes
its own utility function, given the actions (strategies). Thus,
agent i is interested in the solution of the following opti-
mization problem:
maximize
a≤xi≤b
u (xi, zi,n, αi) . (1)
In this paper, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is considered as
the solution of the non-cooperative game among agents. Let
x⋆i,n be the NE strategy of agent i in the game Gn with n
players. At the NE point of the game, no agent has motivation
to unilaterally deviate his strategy given the NE strategy of
the other agents, i.e.,
x⋆i,n = arg max
a≤xi≤b
u
(
xi, z
⋆
i,n, αi
)
, ∀i.
where
z⋆i,n =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
x⋆j,n
Next, the best response function of each agent is introduced
which plays an important role in our final results. The best
response of agent i to zi,n, which follows from the solution
of (1), is defined as
Br (zi,n, αi) = arg max
a≤xi≤b
u (xi, zi,n, αi) , ∀i.
It is well known that, any intersection of the best response
functions of agents is a NE, i.e.,
x⋆i,n = Br
(
z⋆i,n, αi
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2)
This model will be used to characterize the asymptotic
behavior of the NE strategies of agents in the game Gn as
the number of agents becomes large. In practice, the results
obtained in the paper enables a centralised processing center
compute the approximate NE of a large-scale game with
many agents. The processing center approximately computes
the NE based on either a priori information available, e.g.
coming from a previous instance of a similar game, or
explicit information communicated by the agents to the
processing center about their individual utilities, in the form
of (quantized) αis. The communication and computational
model is visualised in Figure 1. Note that, from a techno-
logical perspective, this setup fits well into prevalent cloud
computing models.
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Fig. 1. The communication and computational model.
The following additional assumptions are imposed on the
utility functions of agents and the parameters {αi}i.
1) The best response function is Lipschitz in z with the
Lipschitz constant Lz < 1, i.e., there exists a positive
constant Lz < 1 such that
|Br (z, α)− Br (z′, α)| ≤ Lz|z − z
′| ∀z, z′, α ∈ R
2) The best response function is Lipschitz in the param-
eter α with the Lipschitz constant L, i.e., we can find
a positive constant L such that
|Br (z, α)− Br (z, α′)| ≤ L|α− α′| ∀z, α, α′ ∈ R
3) The empirical distribution of the deterministic pa-
rameters {αi}i converges to a continuous distribution
function P (α) as the number of agents increases.
Let Pn (α) be the (deterministic) empirical distribution
function of {αi}
n
i=1, i.e.,
Pn (α) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{αi≤α}.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
Pn (α) = P (α) ∀x ∈ R. (3)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the best response of each
agent i cannot change arbitrarily fast as its mean variable
zi,n or its parameter αi vary.
Remark 1: We note that our results in this paper do not
entirely depend on the Assumption 3. In the case that the
limiting distribution P (α) is not known or does not exist,
we use the empirical distribution function of Pn (α) to study
the asymptotic behavior of the NE of the game Gn (see
Proposition 3 for more details).
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we first study the existence and unique-
ness of the NE of the game Gn. We next characterize the
asymptotic behavior of NE strategies of agents.
Next theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of
the NE of the game Gn.
Lemma 1: For n ≥ 2, the game Gn admits a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix I.
Lemma 1 is proved by showing that the best response
function of the game forms a contraction mapping. We next
characterize the asymptotic behavior of the (equilibrium)
mean variables z⋆i,ns as the number of agents becomes large.
To this end, consider the sequence of games {Gn}
∞
n=2 with
increasing number of agents such that the equation (3)
holds. For this sequence of games, we define the asymptotic
equilibrium mean (AEM), i.e., z⋆AEM, which captures the
asymptotic behavior of equilibrium mean variables.
Definition 1: Consider the sequence of games {Gn}
∞
n=2
which satisfies the equation (3). Then, the asymptotic equi-
librium mean (AEM) z⋆AEM is defined as the solution of
following equation
z⋆AEM =
∫ ∞
−∞
Br (z⋆AEM, α) dP (α)
= Eν [Br (z
⋆
AEM, ν)] (4)
where ν is a generic random variable distributed according
to P (α).
The asymptotic behavior of the NE of the game Gn can
also be characterized using z⋆AEM. Next, we define the notion
of asymptotic Nash equilibrium (ANE) strategy of each
agent.
Definition 2: Let {Gn}
∞
n=2 be a sequence of games such
that the Assumption 3 in Section II holds. Let z⋆AEM be
the solution of (4). Then, the asymptotic Nash equilibrium
(ANE) strategy of the agent i, denoted by x⋆i,ANE, is defined
as
x⋆i,ANE = Br (z
⋆
AEM, αi) (5)
The next lemma studies the uniqueness of z⋆AEM.
Lemma 2: The equation (4) has a unique solution.
Proof: See Appendix II.
The next theorem studies the asymptotic behavior of
the triangular array of (equilibrium) mean variables{
z⋆i,n, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
n
.
Theorem 1: Consider the sequence of games {Gn}
∞
n=2
such that the Assumption 3 in Section II holds. Let z⋆i,n
denote the equilibrium mean variable of the agent i at the
NE of the game Gn. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆AEM∣∣ = 0.
Proof: Please see Appendix III.
According to Theorem 1, the mean variables of agents, at the
NE of the game, converge uniformly to z⋆AEM as the number
of agents becomes large.
The next corollary shows that the NE strategy of each
agent converges to its ANE strategy as the number of agents
becomes large.
Corollary 1: Let x⋆i,n denote the NE strategy of agent i
in the game Gn. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
x⋆i,n = x
⋆
i,ANE.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 and
the continuity of Br (z, αi) in z.
IV. APPROXIMATING AEM AT THE PROCESSING CENTER
Based on Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, the AEM, i.e.,
z⋆AEM, can be used to approximate the NE strategies of
agents in the game Gn as the number of agents becomes
large. However, to compute the AEM, the processing center
requires (i) the knowledge of the distribution function P (α),
(ii) to solve the implicit equation (4). Even if the distribution
function P (α) is known at the processing center, the expec-
tation on the right hand side of (4) may not have a closed
form expression, e.g., when the P (α) and/or Br (z, α) have
sophisticated forms.
In this section, we first propose a method for approximat-
ing the AEM when P (α) is known at the processing center.
We then consider the case that the processing center does not
know Pn (α) and propose two methods for approximating the
AEM using the actual parameter values {αi}i. Through this
section, it is assumed that the processing center knows the
general form of the utility functions.
1) Approximating the AEM by Quantizing P (α): Assume
that the processing center has a priori information on P (α),
which may be due to domain knowledge or prior experiences,
e.g. when solving a series of games over time with similar
parameters. In such cases, even if the solution is not exact,
it can be used for example as a warm starting point as
part of a multi-stage solution process. However, finding the
exact solution of (4) can be cumbersome when the best
response function is non-linear in α. Here, a quantization-
based approximation method is proposed for computing an
approximation of AEM. The proposed method replaces the
integration of the best response function (with respect to
the continuous distribution P (α)) by a summation to ensure
computational feasibility.
Let Q (·) denote a quantization scheme for P (α). Further,
let Bm and qm denote the mth quantization cell and its
corresponding cell center under the quantization scheme
Q (·). Next, we define an approximation of the AEM which
is computed using the quantization scheme Q (·).
Definition 3: Let Q (·) be a quantization scheme for
P (α). Then, Q (·)-based approximation of z⋆AEM, denoted
by zˆ⋆AEM, is defined as the solution of the following equation
zˆ⋆AEM =
∑
m
Br (zˆ⋆AEM, qm)Pr (Bm)
= Eν [Br (zˆ
⋆
AEM, Q (ν))] (6)
where ν is a random variable with the distribution P (α).
Let the map Fˆ (z) be defined as Fˆ (z) = Eν [Br (z,Q (ν))].
Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, it can be shown that
Fˆ (z) is a contraction and admits a unique fixed point. Thus,
zˆ⋆AEM can be computed using fixed point iterations. Next
Proposition derives an upper bound on the distance between
the zˆ⋆AEM and z
⋆
AEM
Proposition 1: Let Q (·) be a quantization scheme for
P (α) and zˆ⋆AEM be the Q (·)-based approximation of z
⋆
AEM,
i.e., the solution of (6). Then, we have
|z⋆AEM − zˆ
⋆
AEM| ≤
L
1− Lz
Eν [|ν −Q (ν)|] . (7)
Proof: See Appendix V.
Proposition 1 establishes an upper bound on the distance
between zˆ⋆AEM and the z
⋆
AEM which depends on the Lipschitz
constants L,Lz , and the quantization error. Thus, according
to this proposition, the approximation error can be made
arbitrarily small by increasing the number of quantization
levels, which trades-off computational requirements (mem-
ory, processing power) with accuracy.
2) Approximating the AEM Using Pn (α): The Q (·)-
based approximation of z⋆AEM requires that the knowledge
of the distribution function P (α) to be available at the
processing center before solving the game. However, in
many applications, the distribution P (α) may not be known
a priori. Here, an alternative method is proposed which
approximates z⋆AEM using the empirical distribution of {αi}i,
based on the information received by the processing center
from individual agents. To this end, it is assumed that each
agent i transmits its parameter αi to the the processing center.
Note that, as a starting point, it is assumed here that the
agents send real-valued α values. Upon receiving {αi}i, the
processing center will compute Pn (α).
Definition 4: Consider the game Gn in which the em-
pirical distribution of {αi}i is given by Pn (α). Then,
the Pn (α)-based approximation of the z
⋆
AEM, denoted by
zˆ⋆n,AEM, is defined as the solution of the following equation
zˆ⋆n,AEM =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Br
(
zˆ⋆n,AEM, αi
)
= Eνˆn
[
Br
(
zˆ⋆n,AEM, νˆn
)]
(8)
where νˆn is an auxiliary random variable distributed over
{αi}
n
i=1 according to Pn (α) and independent of ν.
It is straight forward to verify that the solution of (8) is
unique and can be found using a fixed point iteration. Note
that zˆ⋆n,AEM depends on n and changes as the number of
agents varies. Next Proposition derives an upper bound on
the distance between z⋆AEM and zˆ
⋆
n,AEM.
Proposition 2: Let zˆ⋆n,AEM denote the Pn (α)-based ap-
proximation of z⋆AEM. Then, we have∣∣zˆ⋆n,AEM − z⋆AEM∣∣ ≤ L1− Lz Eν,νˆn [|ν − νˆn|] . (9)
where ν and νˆn are two independent random variables
distributed according to P (α) and Pn (α), respectively.
Proof: Please see Appendix VI.
According to Proposition 2, the error of the Pn (α)-based
method is upper bounded by the L1 distance between the
random variables ν and νˆn. Note that νˆn converges in distri-
bution to ν since Pn (α) converges to P (α) as n becomes
large. Thus, under mild regularity assumptions, e.g., uniform
integrability of {νˆn}n, νˆn converges in mean to ν [16]. This
implies that the distance between z⋆AEM and zˆ
⋆
n,AEM will
be arbitrarily small as the number of agents becomes large
if the sequence of distribution functions {Pn (α)}n is well-
behaved.
The next Proposition studies the closeness of zˆ⋆n,AEM
and the triangular array of (equilibrium) mean variables{
z⋆i,n, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
n
.
Proposition 3: Consider the non-cooperative game Gn.
Then, the distance between the (equilibrium) mean variables{
z⋆i,n
}
i
and the solution of the Pn (α)-based approximation
can be uniformly bounded as
max
1≤i≤n
∣∣zˆ⋆n,AEM − z⋆i,n∣∣ = O
(
1
n
)
. (10)
Proof: See Appendix VII.
Proposition 3 implies that, for n large enough, the mean
variables
{
z⋆i,n
}
i
of the game Gn can be well approximated
with zˆ⋆n,AEM. Note that Proposition 3 is proved without as-
suming that the sequence of empirical distribution functions
{Pn (α)}n is convergent. Thus, according to this proposition,
zˆ⋆n,AEM can be used to obtain an accurate approximation
of mean variables even if the limiting distribution P (α)
in unknown or it does not exist, i.e., when the sequence
{Pn (α)}n is not convergent.
3) Approximating AEM Using Quantized Prameters:
In order to compute the Pn (α)-based approximation, the
processing center requires the knowledge of {αi}i. Since
the parameters {αi}i are real valued, transmitting each
αi with high accuracy will impose a large communication
cost on each agent as well as a large storage cost on the
processing center. Further, the total communication (storage)
cost of the Pn (α)-based method increases linearly with the
number of agents. Hence, the Pn (α)-based approximation
will become impractical in large population games especially
when Pn (α) changes regularly with time, e.g., when agents
regularly enter or leave the game.
To address this problem, an approximation method is
proposed in which the processing center computes an ap-
proximate AEM using quantized values of {αi}i. Under
the proposed method, each agent i transmits the quantized
version of its αi to the processing center. Then, the process-
ing center computes an approximation of z⋆AEM using the
empirical distribution of the quantized {αi}i. We refer to
this approximation method as αi-quantized approximation.
To this end, consider a quantization scheme on R with k
quantization cells denoted by {Ci}
k
i=1, i.e., {Ci}
k
i=1 form
a non-overlapping partitioning of the real line. Also, let
ci ∈ Ci denote the representative of the cell Ci. Under the
αi-quantized approximation method, the agent i transmits ci
to the processing center if αi belongs to Ci. Thus, each agent
only needs to communicate log2 k bits to the processing
center in order to convey its quantized parameter. We assume
that each Ci is right-closed, thus supCi belongs to Ci.
To study the performance of the αi-quantized approx-
imation method, it is helpful to introduce two auxiliary
random variables νˆn and ν˜n. Let νˆn be a random variable
distributed over {αi}
n
i=1 according to a uniform distribution.
The random variable ν˜n, which is distributed over {ci}
k
i=1,
is constructed using νˆn as follows
ν˜n = ci if νˆn ∈ Ci (11)
Note that the distribution function of ν˜n, denoted as P˜n (x),
can be written as
P˜n (x) =
k∑
j=1
1{cj≤x<cj+1}
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{αi≤supCj}
where ck+1 =∞.
Next the notion of αi-quantized approximation of z
⋆
AEM
is defined.
Definition 5: The αi-quantized approximation of z
⋆
AEM,
denoted by z˜⋆n,AEM, is defined as the solution of the follow-
ing equation
z˜⋆n,AEM =
k∑
j=1
Br
(
z˜⋆n,AEM, cj
) 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{αi∈Cj}
= Eν˜n
[
Br
(
z˜⋆n,AEM, ν˜n
)]
where
∑
i 1{αi∈Cj} is the number of agents which transmit
cj to the processing center.
To compute z˜⋆n,AEM, the processing center requires to store
{cj}
k
j=1 and
{∑n
i=1 1{αi∈Cj}
}k
j=1
which can be stored with
at most k log2 k+k log2 n bits. However, to compute zˆ
⋆
n,AEM,
the processing center needs to store n real variables.
Next Proposition studies the closeness of the solutions of
the αi-quantized and Pn (α)-based methods.
Proposition 4: Let z˜⋆n,AEM denote the solution of the αi-
quantized approximation method. Then, we have
∣∣z˜⋆n,AEM − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣ ≤ L1− Lz Eνˆn [|ν˜n − νˆn|] . (12)
where the expectation is with respect to the distribution of
νˆn as ν˜n is a function of νˆn.
Proof: See Appendix VIII.
According to the Proposition 4, the distance between the
solutions of the Pn (α)-based and αi-quantized methods is
controlled by L, Lz and the L1 distance between the random
variables νˆn and ν˜n. Similar to Pn (α)-based AEM ap-
proximation, the αi-quantized AEM approximation method
does not impose any assumption on the convergence of
{Pn (α)}n. Thus, this approximation method can be used
to obtain an approximation of the NE when the distribution
function P (α) is unknown or does not exists. We note that
one can combine the result of Proposition 4 with that in
Propositions 2, to obtain a bound on the difference between
z˜⋆n,AEM and AEM.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we consider a non-cooperative game and
numerically analyze the proximity of the equilibrium behav-
ior of agents with the asymptotic equilibrium mean (AEM)
and the solution of the Pn (α)-based approximation method.
To this end, consider a non-cooperative game in which the
utility function of agent i is given by
u (xi, zi,n, αi) = −
(
xi −
√
z2i,n + α
2
i
)2
− 2xi.
It is assumed that the empirical distribution of the parameters
{αi}i converges to the distribution function of a Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and of variance 4. The
action space of each agent is limited to the interval [0.5, 20].
Fig. 2 shows the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy of Agent
1 and its corresponding equilibrium mean variable as a
function of the number of agents. According to Fig.2, the
asymptotic Nash equilibrium strategy of Agent 1 and the
AEM characterize the equilibrium behavior of Agent 1 as
n becomes large. More precisely, based on this figure, the
NE strategy of Agent 1 converges to its asymptotic Nash
equilibrium strategy, i.e., x⋆1,ANE, as the number of agents
becomes large. Similarly, the equilibrium mean variable of
Agent 1 converges to the AEM as depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3 illustrates the error of the Pn (α)-based approx-
imation method, i.e., max1≤i≤n
∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣, with the
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Fig. 2. The behavior of the Nash equilibrium strategy and equilibrium
mean variable of Agent 1 with the number of agents.
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Fig. 3. The error of the Pn (α)-based approximation method with the
number of agents.
number of agents. According to this figure, the error of
the Pn (α)-based approximation method decays to zero as
the number of agents becomes large. Moreover, based on
this figure, the Pn (α)-based approximation method can be
used to obtain an accurate (uniform) approximation of the
equilibrium mean variables of agents even for moderate
number of agents.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the equilibrium behavior of
agents in a class of large-scale heterogeneous mean-field
games in which the utility function of each agent depends
on its action, average of other agents’ actions and a fixed
parameter. First, it was shown that the mean variables of all
agents converge to a constant, named asymptotic equilibrium
mean (AEM), as the number of agents becomes large. Then,
the problem of approximating the AEM at a processing
center was considered and three approximation methods were
proposed which allow the processing center to approximate
the AEM under limited computational and communication
resources.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Lemma 1 is proved by showing that the best response
function of the game Gn forms a contraction map in the
infinity norm. To this end, let X = [x1, · · · , xn]
⊤
and
X ′ = [x′1, · · · , x
′
n]
⊤
be two n-dimensional vectors. Also,
let Z = [zi,n]i, and Z
′ =
[
z′i,n
]
i
where zi,n =
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i xj
and z′i,n =
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i x
′
j . Let G (X) : [a, b]
n
7→ [a, b]
n
be
the best response of agents to X ∈ [a, b]
n
, i.e., G (X) =
[Br (zi,n, αi)]i. Note that Z − Z
′ can be written as
Z − Z ′ =
1
n− 1
(1n − In) (X −X
′) (13)
where 1n is an n-by-n matrix with all entries equal to
one and In is an n-by-n identity matrix. Thus, we have
‖Z − Z ′‖∞ ≤ ‖X −X
′‖∞. The infinity norm of G (X)−
G (X ′) can be upper bounded as
‖G (X)−G (X ′)‖∞ = max
i
∣∣Br (zi,n, αi)− Br (z′i,n, αi)∣∣
(a)
≤ Lz max
i
∣∣zi,n − z′i,n∣∣
= Lz ‖Z − Z
′‖∞
≤ Lz ‖X −X
′‖∞
where (a) follows from the fact that the best response
function is Lipschitz in z. This implies that the G (X) is
a contraction as Lz < 1, hence, it admits a unique fixed
point [17]. Since Nash equilibria are fixed points of the best
response function, the game Gn admits a unique NE.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To prove this lemma, let F (z) = Eν [Br (z, ν)]. We show
that F (z) : [a, b] 7→ [a, b] is a contraction. Note that
|F (z)− F (z′)| can be upper bounded as
|F (z)− F (z′)| = |Eν [Br (z, ν)]− Eν [Br (z
′, ν)]|
≤ Eν [|Br (z, ν)− Br (z
′, ν)|]
≤ Eν [Lz |z − z
′|]
= Lz |z − z
′|
Thus, the map F (z) has a unique fixed point.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First note that
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆AEM∣∣ can be upper bounded as
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆AEM∣∣ (a)≤ ∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆1,n∣∣+ ∣∣z⋆1,n − z⋆AEM∣∣
(b)
=
1
n− 1
∣∣x⋆i,n − x⋆1,n∣∣+ ∣∣z⋆1,n − z⋆AEM∣∣
(c)
≤
2max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
+
∣∣z⋆1,n − z⋆AEM∣∣ (14)
where (a) follows from the triangle inequality, (b) follows
from the fact that
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆1,n∣∣ = 1n−1 ∣∣x⋆i,n − x⋆1,n∣∣ and (c)
follows from the fact that a ≤ x⋆i,n ≤ b for all i. Next, we
derive an expression for z⋆AEM. For δ > 0, let the set B
δ
j
be defined as Bδj = {(j − 1) δ < ν ≤ jδ} and ν¯
δ
j be a point
in Bδj . Next Lemma establishes an asymptotic expansion for
z⋆AEM in terms of δ, B
δ
j and ν¯
δ
j .
Lemma 3: For all δ > 0, z⋆AEM can be written as
z⋆AEM =
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
)
Prν
(
Bδj
)
+O (Lδ)
where Prν
(
Bδj
)
= Pr {(j − 1) δ < ν ≤ jδ}.
Proof: See Appendix IV.
Next, we derive a similar asymptotic expansion for z⋆1,n. To
this end, let θn be a random variable distributed according
to the empirical distribution of {αi}
n
i=2.
Lemma 4: For all δ > 0, z⋆1,n can be written as
z⋆1,n =
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆1,n, ν¯
δ
j
)
Prθn
(
Bδj
)
+O (Lδ)
+O
(
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
)
where Prθn
(
Bδj
)
= Pr {(j − 1) δ < θn ≤ jδ}.
Proof: See Appendix IV.
Combining Lemmas 3 and 4, we have
z⋆AEM − z
⋆
1,n
=
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
)
Prν
(
Bδj
)
− Br
(
z⋆1,n, ν¯
δ
j
)
Prθn
(
Bδj
)
+O (Lδ) +O
(
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
) (
Prν
(
Bδj
)
− Prθn
(
Bδj
))
+
∞∑
j=∞
(
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
)
− Br
(
z⋆1,n, ν¯
δ
j
))
Prθn
(
Bδj
)
+O (Lδ) +O
(
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
)
(15)
The absolute value of the second term on the right hand side
of (the last equality in) (15) can be upper bounded as∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=−∞
(
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
)
− Br
(
z⋆1,n, ν¯
δ
j
))
Prθn
(
Bδj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
j=−∞
∣∣(Br (z⋆AEM, ν¯δj )− Br (z⋆1,n, ν¯δj ))∣∣Prθn (Bδj )
(a)
≤
∞∑
j=−∞
Lz
∣∣z⋆AEM − z⋆1,n∣∣Prθn (Bδj )
= Lz
∣∣z⋆AEM − z⋆1,n∣∣ (16)
where (a) follows from the fact that Br (z, α) is Lipschitz
in z. Combining equations (15) and (16), we have
(1− Lz)
∣∣z⋆AEM − z⋆1,n∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
) (
Prν
(
Bδj
)
− Prθn
(
Bδj
))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+O (Lδ) +O
(
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
)
(17)
Next lemma studies the asymptotic behavior of the first term
in the right hand side of (17).
Lemma 5: We have
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
) (
Prν
(
Bδj
)
− Prθn
(
Bδj
))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
Proof: See Appendix IV.
Combining equations (14), (17) and Lemma 5, we have
lim
n→∞
sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆AEM∣∣ ≤ O (Lδ) (18)
The desired result follows from the fact that the positive
constant δ can be arbitrarily close to zero.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF AUXILIARY LEMMAS
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Note that z⋆AEM can be written as
z⋆AEM = Eν [Br (z
⋆
AEM, ν)]
= Eν

 ∞∑
j=−∞
Br (z⋆AEM, ν) 1{Bδj}


(a)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[
Br (z⋆AEM, ν) 1{Bδj}
]
=
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[(
Br (z⋆AEM, ν)− Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
)
+Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
))
1{Bδj}
]
=
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[(
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
))
1{Bδj}
]
+
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[(
Br (z⋆AEM, ν)− Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
))
1{Bδj}
]
(19)
where (a) follows from Lebesgue dominated convergence
Theorem. The second term in the right hand side of (19) can
be upper bounded as∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[(
Br (z⋆AEM, ν)− Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
))
1{Bδj}
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[∣∣(Br (z⋆AEM, ν)− Br (z⋆AEM, ν¯δj ))∣∣ 1{Bδj}
]
(a)
≤
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[
L
∣∣ν − ν¯δj ∣∣ 1{Bδj}
]
(b)
≤
∞∑
j=−∞
Eν
[
Lδ1{Bδj}
]
= Lδ
∞∑
j=−∞
Prν
(
Bδj
)
= Lδ (20)
where (a) follows from the fact that Br (z, α) is Lipschitz
in α and (b) follows from the fact that
∣∣ν − ν¯δj ∣∣ ≤ δ when ν
belongs to Bδj . Combining equations (19) and (20), we have
z⋆AEM =
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
)
Prν
(
Bδj
)
+O (Lδ)
B. Proof of Lemma 4
We can write z⋆1,n as
z⋆1,n =
1
n− 1
∑
i=2
x⋆i,n
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αi
)
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Br
(
z⋆1,n, αi
)
+
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αi
)
− Br
(
z⋆1,n, αi
)
(21)
The absolute value of the second term on the right hand side
of (21) can be upper bounded as
1
n− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=2
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αi
)
− Br
(
z⋆1,n, αi
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
∣∣Br (z⋆i,n, αi)− Br (z⋆1,n, αi)∣∣
(a)
≤
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Lz
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆1,n∣∣
(b)
≤
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Lz
n− 1
∣∣x⋆i,n − x⋆1,n∣∣
(c)
≤
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Lz
n− 1
2max (|a| , |b|)
=
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
(22)
where (a) follows from the fact that Br (z, α) is Lips-
chitz in z, (b) follows from the fact that
∣∣z⋆i,n − z⋆1,n∣∣ =
1
n−1
∣∣x⋆i,n − x⋆1,n∣∣ and (c) follows from the fact that a ≤
x⋆i,n ≤ b for all i. Thus, we have
z⋆1,n =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Br
(
z⋆1,n, αi
)
+O
(
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
)
Let θn be a random variable distributed according to the
empirical distribution of {αi}
n
i=2, i.e., a uniform distribution
over {αi}
n
i=2. Then, we have
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Br
(
z⋆1,n, αi
)
= Eθn
[
Br
(
z⋆1,n, θn
)]
Following similar steps as those in the Appendix IV-A, we
have
Eθn
[
Br
(
z⋆1,n, θn
)]
=
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆1,n, ν¯
δ
j
)
Prθn
(
Bδj
)
+O (Lδ) +O
(
2Lz max (|a| , |b|)
n− 1
)
where Prθn
(
Bδj
)
= Pr {(j − 1)δ < θn ≤ jδ}.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
Let θn be a random variable distributed according to the
empirical distribution of {αi}
n
i=2. We define two axillary
random variables γ and γn , distributed over
{
ν¯δj
}∞
j=−∞
,
with the following probability mass functions:
Pr
(
γ = ν¯δj
)
:= Prν
(
Bδj
)
= Pr {(j − 1)δ < ν ≤ jδ}
Pr
(
γn = ν¯
δ
j
)
:= Prθn
(
Bδj
)
= Pr {(j − 1)δ < θn ≤ jδ}
Thus, we have
∞∑
j=−∞
Br
(
z⋆AEM, ν¯
δ
j
) (
Prν
(
Bδj
)
− Prθn
(
Bδj
))
= Eγ [Br (z
⋆
AEM, γ)]− Eγn [Br (z
⋆
AEM, γn)] (23)
The distribution functions of γ and γn can be written as
Pr {γ ≤ x} =
∞∑
j=−∞
1{ν¯δj−1≤x<ν¯δj}
Pr {ν ≤ (j − 1) δ}
Pr {γn ≤ x} =
∞∑
j=−∞
1{ν¯δj−1≤x<ν¯δj}
Pr {θn ≤ (j − 1) δ}
Since Pn (α) converges in distribution to P (α), θn also
converges in distribution to P (α). Recall that ν is distributed
according to P (α). The distribution function P (α) is con-
tinuous, thus, we have
lim
n→∞
Pr {θn ≤ (j − 1) δ} = Pr {ν ≤ (j − 1) δ}
as θn converges in distribution to P (α) which implies that
γn converges in distribution to γ. Since Br (z, α) is bounded
and continuous in α, and γn converges in distribution to γ,
we have
lim
n→∞
Eγn [Br (z
⋆
AEM, γn)] = Eγ [Br (z
⋆
AEM, γ)]
[16] which completes the proof.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Note that |z⋆AEM − zˆ
⋆
AEM| can be upper bounded as
|z⋆AEM − zˆ
⋆
AEM|
= |Eν [Br (z
⋆
AEM, ν)− Br (zˆ
⋆
AEM, Q (ν))]|
≤ Eν [|Br (z
⋆
AEM, ν)− Br (z
⋆
AEM, Q (ν))|]
+ Eν [|Br (z
⋆
AEM, Q (ν))− Br (zˆ
⋆
AEM, Q (ν))|]
(a)
≤ LEν [|ν −Q (ν)|] + Lz |z
⋆
AEM − zˆ
⋆
AEM|
where (a) follows from the fact that the best response
function is Lipschitz in z and α. The desired result follows
from the last inequality above.
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To prove this result, we rewrite
∣∣zˆ⋆n,AEM − z⋆AEM∣∣ as∣∣z⋆AEM − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣
=
∣∣Eν [Br (z⋆AEM, ν)]− Eνˆn [Br (zˆ⋆n,AEM, νˆn)]∣∣
=
∣∣Eν,νˆn [Br (z⋆AEM, ν)− Br (zˆ⋆n,AEM, νˆn)]∣∣
where ν and νˆn are two random variables distributed ac-
cording to P (α) and Pn (α), receptively. The desired result
follows from similar steps as those in the proof of Proposition
1.
APPENDIX VII
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The distance between z⋆i,n and zˆ
⋆
n,AEM can be upper
bounded as∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Br
(
z⋆j,n, αj
)
−
1
n
∑
j
Br
(
zˆ⋆n,AEM, αj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Br
(
z⋆j,n, αj
)
− Br
(
z⋆i,n, αj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αj
)
−
1
n
∑
j
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
∑
j
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αj
)
− Br
(
zˆ⋆n,AEM, αj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Lz
∣∣z⋆j,n − z⋆i,n∣∣+ 1n
∑
j
Lz
∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αi
)
−
1
n (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
Br
(
z⋆i,n, αj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(24)
Note that a ≤ Br (z, α) ≤ b. Also,
∣∣z⋆j,n − z⋆i,n∣∣ can be upper
bounded as ∣∣z⋆j,n − z⋆i,n∣∣ = 1n− 1
∣∣x⋆j,n − x⋆i,n∣∣
≤
2max (|b| , |a|)
n− 1
as a ≤ xi ≤ b. Thus,
∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣ can be further upper
bounded as
∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣ ≤ 2max (|b| , |a|)
(
Lz
n− 1
+
1
n
)
+ Lz
∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣
Hence, we have
∣∣z⋆i,n − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣ ≤ 2max (|b| , |a|)1− Lz
(
Lz
n− 1
+
1
n
)
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX VIII
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Note that the Pn (α)-based AEM can be written as
zˆ⋆n,AEM =
1
n
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Br
(
zˆ⋆n,AEM, αi
)
1{αi∈Cj}
Thus, we have∣∣z˜⋆n,AEM − zˆ⋆n,AEM∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(
Br
(
zˆ⋆n,AEM, αi
)
− Br
(
z˜⋆n,AEM, cj
))
1{αi∈Cj}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
n
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
∣∣(Br (zˆ⋆n,AEM, αi)− Br (zˆ⋆n,AEM, cj))∣∣ 1{αi∈Cj}
+
1
n
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
∣∣(Br (zˆ⋆n,AEM, cj)− Br (z˜⋆n,AEM, cj))∣∣ 1{αi∈Cj}
≤
1
n
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
L |αi − cj | 1{αi∈Cj}
+
1
n
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Lz
∣∣zˆ⋆n,AEM − z˜⋆n,AEM∣∣ 1{αi∈Cj}
= Lz
∣∣zˆ⋆n,AEM − z˜⋆n,AEM∣∣+ LEνˆn [|ν˜n − νˆn|]
REFERENCES
[1] R. J. Aumann, “Markets with a continuum of traders,” Econometrica,
vol. 32, no. 1/2, pp. 39–50, 1964.
[2] J. W. Milnor and L. S. Shapley, “Values of large games ii: Oceanic
games,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 290–
307, 1978.
[3] A. Neyman, “Values of games with infinitely many players,” ser.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Elsevier,
2002, vol. 3, pp. 2121 – 2167.
[4] A. Haurie and P. Marcotte, “On the relationship between nash-cournot
and wardrop equilibria,” Networks, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 295–308, 1985.
[5] H. Yu and W. Zhu, “Large games with transformed summary statis-
tics,” Economic Theory, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 237–241, 2005.
[6] M. T. Rauh, “Non-cooperative games with a continuum of players
whose payoffs depend on summary statistics,” Economic Theory,
vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 901–906, 2003.
[7] M. A. Khan and Y. Sun, “Non-cooperative games with many play-
ers,” ser. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
Elsevier, 2002, vol. 3, pp. 1761 – 1808.
[8] M. Khan, K. P. Rath, and Y. Sun, “On the existence of pure strategy
equilibria in games with a continuum of players,” Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 13 – 46, 1997.
[9] D. Bauso and R. Pesenti, “Mean field linear quadratic games with set
up costs,” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 89–104,
2013.
[10] F. Bagagiolo and D. Bauso, “Mean-field games and dynamic demand
management in power grids,” Dynamic Games and Applications,
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 155–176, 2014.
[11] Z. Ma, D. S. Callaway, and I. A. Hiskens, “Decentralized charging
control of large populations of plug-in electric vehicles,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 67–78, Jan
2013.
[12] S. Grammatico, F. Parise, M. Colombino, and J. Lygeros, “Decen-
tralized convergence to nash equilibria in constrained deterministic
mean field control,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61,
no. 11, pp. 3315–3329, Nov 2016.
[13] M. Huang, R. P. Malhame, and P. E. Caines, “Large population
stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop mckean-vlasov systems and
the nash certainty equivalence principle,” Commun. Inf. Syst., vol. 6,
no. 3, pp. 221–252, 2006.
[14] M. Huang, “Large-population LQG games involving a major player:
The nash certainty equivalence principle,” SIAM Journal on Control
and Optimization, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 3318–3353, 2010.
[15] M. Nourian and P. E. Caines, “ǫ-nash mean field game theory for
nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with major and minor agents,”
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 3302–
3331, 2013.
[16] P. Billingsley, Probability and Measure, ser. Wiley Series in Probabil-
ity and Statistics. Wiley, 1995.
[17] D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Compu-
tation: Numerical Methods. Athena Scientific, 1997.
